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From Parameters, Autumn 2001, pp. 17-33.
"It's our duty to develop soldiers and leaders who have the skills necessary to succeed today and in the
future." -- General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, US Army[1]

Four years ago in Brcko, Bosnia-Herzegovina, a US Army captain and his platoon leaders were given the mission to
protect and hold a bridge, a critical terrain feature at the epicenter of the three-way ethnic conflict in Bosnia. Their
mission was clearly tactical in nature: physically guard and hold the bridge; do not allow it to fall into the hands of any
of the ethnic factions. Surrendering the bridge would give the side that controls it a new and distinct advantage vis-àvis its adversaries. Failure to hold the bridge could upset the tenuous peace that had recently been established and was
being enforced by NATO forces. It could put the entire peacekeeping mission in jeopardy. Destroying the bridge to
prevent its capture was not an option--that would undermine the overall effort and the goal of economic reconstruction
and development. The tactical mission had significant strategic implications, a situation dramatically different from
that confronting junior officers even as recently as the Gulf War. If the unit didn't accomplish its assigned mission, that
could lead directly to strategic failure.
The captain and his lieutenants were given a second piece of guidance that had been reinforced during weeks of predeployment training. They were to avoid the use of deadly force if at all possible. According to the rules of
engagement, the soldiers could shoot to kill if they believed their lives were in danger, but they were discouraged from
being quick to shoot. The chain of command wanted to avoid a shooting incident, fearing that broadcast images of
dead or injured civilians shot by NATO peacekeepers could undermine the fragile political and public support for
SFOR's mission. The officers were also told to avoid US casualties. The American public would not tolerate another
Somalia or Beirut, and so a platoon of dead GIs could also lead directly to strategic failure.
Imagine what the platoon leaders must have thought, then, when the unit came under assault by ethnic Serbs. A mob of
civilians--many of them women and elderly men--gathered and marched on the position, trying to force the American
soldiers aside. The confrontation became violent. The mob began to hurl rocks, bricks, Molotov cocktails, and other
debris at the soldiers in an attempt to take over the bridge. Incited by ringleaders in the rear of the crowd, the mob next
attacked the Americans by swinging long boards that had spikes driven through the ends. The Serbs were able to swing
the boards over the rows of protective concertina wire and injure the American defenders. The platoon leaders called
urgently for reinforcements, and the soldiers did all they could to hold the bridge without shooting the attacking Serbs.
But no reinforcements could arrive in time, the violence continued to escalate, and the American position became more
tenuous. The young officers had to decide whether to fire on the attacking civilians, withdraw from the bridge, or
continue to hold while risking serious injury or death to their soldiers.[2] What should they do?
More important from an institutional perspective, what had the Army done to prepare the officers for this situation?
What did "right" look like? Were these officers making a tactical, operational, or strategic decision? Were they in
reality making all three?
In numerous situations in the post-Cold War strategic environment--from the Balkans to Haiti, from Mogadishu to Los
Angeles--American military forces at the lowest tactical levels have and will continue to make potentially strategiclevel decisions as they carry out increasingly complex missions in a significantly expanded professional jurisdiction. In
addition to traditional warfighting, Army leaders from top to bottom must be able to deal with the increased political

and cultural complexities of peace operations, stability and support operations, humanitarian interventions, forward
presence and engagement, homeland defense, and more. Our young officers are routinely thrust into volatile, uncertain,
complex, and ambiguous situations in which more is demanded of them in terms of intellect, initiative, and leadership
than was normally seen during the Cold War.
The same is true for senior leaders. The essence of the military role at the strategic level is to advise civilian authorities
on the measured application of violence in the pursuit of national goals and objectives. As a result, lieutenant colonels,
colonels, and general officers must operate in a more complex task environment than during the Cold War. In addition
to conventional warfare and nuclear strategy (which is scarcely studied any more), senior officers must deal with
complex transnational threats that include peace support operations, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, military
assistance to civilian authorities, and cyber-terrorism. As General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, observed
of his command in Bosnia, "It's the most difficult leadership experience I have ever had. Nothing quite prepares you
for this."[3]
Indeed, what do we need to do to prepare our Army's leaders "for this"? How can we provide the requisite education
and strategic decisionmaking competencies to successfully accomplish these missions? Given its expanded
jurisdiction, what should the Army as a profession be doing in terms of education, ethics, oversight, and credentialing?
Has the Army's jurisdiction outrun its educational system? Have they become decoupled? And if so, how do we
reconnect the two? As our Army transforms to meet emerging security challenges, and we ponder new weaponry,
formations, doctrine, and training, it is imperative we also examine our approach to educating our officers, our
profession's "change agents."[4]
The new security environment requires that the Army's officer education system also be transformed to meet the
demands of its expanded professional jurisdiction. First and foremost, the professional Army officer must of course be
firmly grounded in the fundamentals of tactics, technology, and leadership. These are clearly the basics. But integrated
into officer development we also need a more holistic educational approach that imbues a notion of "lifelong learning"
to the profession. Officers will need to have a better understanding of basic strategic concepts earlier in their careers,
with a continuing emphasis on that as a component of an officer's education throughout his or her career. This will
provide officers a strong intellectual foundation, a solid grasp of the tools of the strategic trade, and two decades of
real-world experience when they arrive at the senior service college level. This model would transform the senior
service college into a capstone in strategic education, as opposed to the start point. It would establish a glide-path for
officers' strategic growth, gradually increasing the portion of strategic education from pre-commissioning training
through the Army War College and beyond.
This article will briefly review the "new professionalism" concept and examine the Army's current approach to officer
education. It will then examine briefly the emerging challenges of the strategic environment that necessitate this
change and the adequacy of the current system. It will conclude with recommendations to bridge the gap between the
Army's professional jurisdiction (what our officers are being required to do) and the level of professional knowledge
they have to apply to their work.
This is a daunting requirement in many ways. One expert suggested it is like trying to prepare someone now for the
Olympic games in 10 or 20 years when you do not know what the events will be. Still, the history of the past decade
provides clear insights into the types of missions the Army will be called on to perform. The immediate future will
continue to look a lot like the past decade, and the Army should expect and plan for the types of missions it has
assumed since the end of the Cold War to continue, if not increase.
The New Professionalism
According to sociologist Andrew Abbott, "professions are somewhat exclusive groups of individuals applying
somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases."[5] He postulates that the evolution of and interrelationships among
professions are determined by how a profession controls its required knowledge and skills. "Practical skill grows out of
an abstract system of knowledge, and control of the occupation lies in control of the abstractions that generate the
practical techniques."[6] He argues that unless a knowledge system is governed by abstractions, it cannot redefine its
problems and tasks, nor can it defend its turf from competitors or seize new tasks that it might desire. Abstract

knowledge is what enables professions to survive in the competitive "system of professions." This knowledge system
and its attendant degree of abstraction "are the ultimate currency of competition between professions."[7]
Obviously, professions demand a precise system of higher education that not only allows for the professional to master
the appropriate body of abstract knowledge but also evolves as the requirements of the profession grow and new
improvements and techniques are adopted. In explaining the rise and fall of various professions over time, Abbott
posits that the key variable can be traced to "the power of the professions' knowledge systems, their abstracting ability
to define old problems in new ways." In other words, abstraction of professional knowledge is what enables a
profession to survive and flourish.[8]
It is in the workplace, at the point of effort, that the complexity of the profession has its effect. If there is too much
work, as some argue is the case for the Army today in the new security environment, then nonprofessionals will
typically move into the void to do the required work. When this happens, jurisdictional boundaries between professions
tend to blur or disappear.[9] This is happening today to a degree in the arena of peace operations and military
operations other than war. Government agencies, non-governmental organizations, private contractors, other military
services, and coalitions of these actors are competing and participating to varying degrees in these different operations.
To the extent that a profession achieves jurisdiction over a new task, it does so at the potential risk of weakening its
other jurisdictions.[10] Viewed through Abbott's theoretical lens, it is clear that the Army's preference for its
warfighting role vis-à-vis the newer non-warfighting missions that have been thrust upon it reflects a fear that focusing
on the new will dilute and weaken its professional expertise in what it considers its core function, high-intensity
conventional warfare. This is not only an issue of the execution of such missions but is also a question of providing
appropriate recommendations on how military forces can contribute to what are considered "non-traditional" missions.
The changed security environment has disrupted the Army's professional equilibrium. The Army has been ordered to
perform a significant array of new tasks while simultaneously reducing its budget and personnel levels. This has
occurred without any coherent analysis or discussion of the costs and requirements of this expanded jurisdiction. The
Army has clung to what it perceives as its core professional function--high-intensity conventional warfare--while
actively engaging in a wide variety of new missions. Certain tasks have been jettisoned during this change in
orientation. The Army no longer has the nuclear mission, which required significant resources throughout the Cold
War, and the associated analysis of nuclear operations, strategy, and deterrence has disappeared from the Army
education system. Still, as Don Snider and others have explained, all of this has come at a great cost to the
profession.[11]
With such a major shift of effort and expansion of the Army's professional jurisdiction, one might expect to see a
corresponding shift and expansion of its professional knowledge base and in its practical application of that expert
knowledge to its new missions.[12] It is not the purpose of this article to advocate whether the expanded jurisdiction is
good or bad. Rather, it is to argue that the Army should expand the base of professional knowledge that it imparts to its
officer corps in order to close the gap between knowledge and expected performance.
The Army's Approach to Officer Professional Military Education
Military operations are divided into three levels of warfare--tactical, operational, and strategic. Figure 1, below, depicts
these levels, the focus of each, and the associated schooling that an American Army officer undergoes in preparation to
perform his or her professional tasks.

Figure 1. Levels of War and Associated Schooling.

This approach is based on a Cold War paradigm in which the officer normally underwent a rigorous precommissioning undergraduate education at the military academy or a civilian university, followed by roughly 20 years
of training in his basic branch (as a staff officer and commander), prior to the final period of intensive education at a
senior service college. The school system prepares an officer for success at the tactical and operational levels and to
serve in positions of a strategic nature at the rank of lieutenant colonel and above. Inherent in this structure, however,
were two implicit assumptions. First, officers would not serve in positions calling for them to make decisions or
provide advice at a level they had not yet been schooled for. Second, the training and experience officers received at
each level provided an adequate basis for advancement to the next level, where they would receive additional
schooling, as they progressed throughout their careers.
Throughout the Cold War an officer's transition from the tactical and operational to the strategic level was not
necessarily an easy one, but it was facilitated by the relatively simple nature of American strategy during that era. This
strategy could literally be made into a bumper sticker--Deterrence and Containment--which were the desired endstates of US strategy. Today our strategic end-states are less clear, and consequently the intellectual transition from the
tactical and operational levels to the strategic level is much more complex.
Some may take exception with this description based on the fact that the Army has frequently used the words
"training" and "education" interchangeably. They are not the same, however, and there is a significant qualitative
difference. While training is more concerned with teaching what to think and what the answers ought to be, education
is all about teaching how to think and what the questions ought to be. "Training is focused on the development and
performance of specific tasks or skills, and education is oriented toward more generalized and abstract knowledge that
may or may not be tied to specific tasks or action."[13]
Training is most frequently used when the goal is to prepare a leader or an organization to execute specified tasks. It
often includes repetition of task, not unlike an athletic team learning to execute plays. Finally, it is normally the
preferred method of learning when the goal is to perform operations in which success, failure, and completion can be
clearly measured. Education has more to do with how to think about problems and how to deal with those things that
may not lend themselves to outright solutions. It is a matter of intellect, thought, indirect leadership, advice, and
consensus-building.
Organizations normally train for a mission. They are often given a specific mission or deployment and allowed time to
focus their training and preparation efforts on that precise task. This is particularly true when dealing with tactical or
operational missions. In strategic positions, however, officers are expected to be prepared from the outset with a
foundation of abstract professional knowledge that they can expertly apply to a specific situation. This strategic
preparation is primarily a function of education--especially in history, politics, economics, regional and cultural
studies, ethics, and security affairs.
The New Challenge to Educate Leaders

The new security environment has changed the relationship between the levels of war in ways that must be considered
when determining an effective way to educate officers for the future. First, as described at the beginning of this article,
today's young officer is much more likely to be confronted by decisions that may have operational or even strategic
consequences than were his Cold War predecessors. Today's missions in places such as Bosnia or Kosovo are more
politically and culturally complex than were most Cold War missions.
Second, while the student at the senior service colleges in the 1980s could grasp the essence of American national
security strategy with an understanding of deterrence and containment, the same is certainly not true in the year 2001.
No few words can adequately convey the complex nature of the international environment we confront. The senior
officer of today must acquire a much more sophisticated understanding of the integration of all of the elements of
national power (military, diplomatic, economic, and informational) in the pursuit of national objectives. Again, this is
due to the Army's expanded professional jurisdiction, in which its officers are now required to provide advice and
perform more tasks in an increasingly complex environment.
In The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman argues that "globalization" has replaced the Cold War as the new
defining international system.[14] And, he writes, "The globalization system, unlike the Cold War system, is not
frozen, but a dynamic ongoing process."[15] He argues that "if the Cold War were a sport, it would be sumo
wrestling." Quoting Professor Michael Mandelbaum, "It would be two big fat guys in a ring, with all sorts of posturing
and rituals and stomping of feet, but actually very little contact, until the end of the match, when there is a brief
moment of shoving and the loser gets pushed out of the ring, but nobody gets killed." Globalization, by contrast,
"would be the 100-meter dash, over and over and over. And no matter how many times you win, you have to race
again the next day. And if you lose by just one-hundredth of a second, it can be as if you lost by an hour."[16]
Our strategy of containment has been replaced by a strategy of engagement internationally which has been coupled
with increasing demands for the military to become involved in domestic emergencies. This requires more articulate
explanations by military professionals on how to use military forces to shape, respond, and prepare in this new
environment. Success in such operations may be better defined in terms of conflict prevention or resolution as opposed
to clear victory. Officers must be able to articulate clearly what military forces can and cannot do in the pursuit of
national objectives in a particular situation. This application of abstract expert knowledge to a specific situation is the
essence of our profession.
Consequently, we must consider how we educate and develop officers to deal with this level of complexity. In reality,
by the time an officer achieves general officer rank or is asked to serve in senior positions on the Army staff, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, or the National Security Council, he or she may have to move
beyond the circles shown in Figure 1 to achieve some understanding of grand strategy or the full integration of the
nation's military, economic, and diplomatic or political instruments of power. This may require us to look at the
relationship between officer "training" and "education" in a different way.
Figure 2, below, illustrates the differences in training and education as well as the change in emphasis during an
officer's career.

Figure 2. Training and educational development during a career.

Obviously, the initial portion of an officer's development must and should focus on training, with the component
characteristics of physical strength, courage, direct leadership, and so forth. As an officer progresses, the educational
demands of the profession grow and the intellectual component increases. Currently the cross-over point for an officer
is probably when he completes the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.
Civil War history may provide a useful metaphor in our analysis. During that conflict, corps commanders could
exercise direct leadership in coordinating and controlling a well-defined set of military and technical skills at the
tactical level of war for their units. They could see, understand, and directly control everything that happened in their
corps area of operations. If one goes to the Gettysburg battlefield and stands at the statue of General Lee, where
Pickett's charge began, the open field visible to the left and right is essentially the frontage a corps occupied. A corps
commander essentially operated at the top of a professional comfort zone in which he had grown up and developed
expertise since his time as an academy cadet.
The history of that war is replete, however, with commanders who were successful at the corps level but failed when
they advanced to army command. The problem was that army command removed them from their comfort zone and
placed them in a task environment for which they were not professionally prepared. They could no longer see,
understand, or directly control everything in their expanded area of operations due to the increased size of the
formation and dispersion on the battlefield. Instead they had to develop a picture of what was happening based on
imperfect and often incomplete information gathered from others. Furthermore, as army commanders they were more
involved in the civil-military relationships emanating from Washington.
Leadership and control were now at the indirect level, and the application of military force had migrated to the
operational level of war. The army-level commander required a different set of professional skills to be successful in
an expanded and more complex jurisdiction--skills that he did not have, and an environment for which the Army had
not prepared him. This shift in required professional expertise from direct to indirect leadership is tied to the difference
between training and education. Examples abound on both sides, from Generals Hooker and Burnside in the Union
Army, to Generals Hood, Longstreet, and Early who fought for the Confederacy. These men were all outstanding
direct leaders who achieved excellent results when they led formations that were appropriate for their direct-level
leadership skills, but who were relatively ineffective when placed in command of larger formations that required
indirect-level leadership.[17]
This historical analysis, when considered within today's strategic context, suggests that our traditional model of
training and educating officers should be transformed to meet the requirements of today's security environment. In

today's warfighting arena, a lieutenant colonel in command of a battalion task force must lead at the indirect level as
well as the direct, given the time and distance factors and weapon ranges in modern ground combat.[18] Like their
predecessors in the Civil War, those who cannot adapt to this level of leadership will be ineffective. Thus, for all the
missions our officers must perform--from warfighting to peacekeeping--waiting until the 20-year point in an officer's
career and then trying to transform officers from tacticians and operators to strategists during ten months at a senior
service college may simply be too little, too late, if we expect our officers to render the professional services that the
nation now requires. In the "transformed" Army that is envisioned, this will become increasingly difficult as officers
not only are involved in more complex positions on staffs but as enhanced brigades assume missions and frontages that
are now appropriate for divisions or even corps.
The technological advances of the revolution in military affairs also complicate as well as encourage change in the
educational development of officers. Commanders of the future may be able to achieve total "situational awareness,"
but this could present two dangers. First, the ability of the strategic leader to view, communicate, and effect what
subordinate commanders are doing may draw them down into the details of tactical and operational decisionmaking.
From a professional perspective, this runs counter to our stated doctrine and preference for devolving power and
authority to lower levels, then trusting subordinate commanders to execute the mission. Such behavior on the part of
strategic leaders also contributes to morale problems and the decline in professionalism that many authors have
described.
The second danger is that future commanders may also be attracted to the notion that if they delay decisions, they may
receive the final piece of intelligence that will provide a complete picture. Obviously, this ignores the basic fact that
delay is a choice that may have serious consequences, particularly at the strategic level. It further encourages a
conservative approach to decisionmaking and a zero-defects mentality. This focus on zero defects and
micromanagement is already having a corrosive effect upon the officer corps. It has been identified in studies of junior
officer retention as what officers dislike most about the profession and is a leading reason cited for their departure
before retirement. An educational program that properly develops an officer will serve to dampen these tendencies and
encourage officers to both master technology and devolve control to the lowest possible level.
Ways to Bridge the Jurisdiction-Knowledge Gap
The transformation of the Army demands a change in our educational approach and philosophy. The first element of
this may be for the Army to recognize that conflicts such as Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti are not unique, but
rather are the types of conflicts that we will be engaging in for a significant period of time. Eliot Cohen groups these
types of missions together under the label of "Policing the Empire," and recommends that the Army get used to them
and prepare to meet them for the foreseeable future. They are simply part of our current global security responsibilities.
Our era may be similar to the period from the end of the Civil War until World War I, when the American Army was
confronted with constabulary-type operations on the frontier, a minor war with Spain, the insurrection in the
Philippines, and an expedition into Mexico to chase Pancho Villa. Thus it was more than 50 years from the end of the
last major war (the Civil War) until our entry into the next (World War I). Although the Army argues that "fighting
and winning the nation's wars" is its raison d'être, there is growing recognition and acceptance that the non-warfighting
missions are probably here to stay.
This is not all bad--such missions provide excellent opportunities for the experiential development of our officer corps.
Junior officers who have served in recent operations such as Kosovo and Bosnia have achieved a wealth of experience
in joint, combined, and interagency operations far exceeding that of most lieutenants and captains during the Cold
War. Unlike the unsuccessful Civil War generals who were pulled out of their comfort zone in corps command and did
not adapt to the more complex world of indirect leadership at the army level, many of today's junior officers have
survived and even flourished in the Army's new roles. At a young age, many of these officers have dealt successfully
with the new missions. They are hungry for the abstract knowledge that might have helped them in performing these
missions, and which they know they will need as they advance in the profession. They also want to ensure that their
successors have the knowledge base that they lacked.
The pressure of cascading responsibility, coupled with jurisdictional expansion, requires careful examination. As a

result, the Army should consider a more holistic approach to officer education and professionalism, as was indicated in
Figure 2. An officer's training requirements decrease as he rises in rank, while his corresponding education
requirements increase. What is needed is more than just getting officers to think at the strategic level of war and
politics, but educating officers to think broadly and contextually, and providing them a wider and deeper way of seeing
the world. This is not an either/or proposition; rather, it suggests a greater fusion between training and education
across the officer's career.
Industry in the United States has already made this determination in several ways. Successful businesses consider that
the "learning organization" requires organizational learning in addition to traditional training. Organizational learning
is a set of processes and structures to help people create new knowledge, share their understanding, and continuously
improve themselves and the results of their enterprises. It is not so much a program as it is a philosophy that the
leadership of the organization adopts.[19]
In similar fashion, a study on Joint Professional Military Education in 1999 found that the regional commanders-inchief (CINCs) believe officers need to be exposed to joint matters earlier in their career.[20] This suggests a
requirement for continuous and gradually increasing intellectual development over the course of an Army officer's
career. To successfully grow strategic leaders for its new jurisdiction, the Army cannot wait until the 20-year point in
its officers' careers to educate them in security studies. That should be a part of the professional military education
program from one's pre-commissioning education, building continuously at each formal school, during unit Officer
Professional Development, and through continuing education. The senior service college experience can then become
a capstone program in advanced strategic studies as opposed to an introduction to strategy. Perhaps most important is
the need to imbue in the profession the requirement for life-long learning.
The technology of distance learning offers a tremendous opportunity to assist in making this educational concept a
reality. This method must be fully explored and used in innovative ways. Examples for consideration include tying the
Officer Professional Development program into distance technology, and requiring a program of continuing education
analogous to that found in other professions like medicine. Distance technology might be used to integrate strategic
education into already existing courses such as the Officers Basic Course, the Captains Career Course, the Combined
Arms Services Staff School, and the Command and General Staff College. It could also be useful in assisting junior
officers in studying core professional requirements in history, politics, philosophy, economics, culture, and geography,
subjects they may have been unable to take during their undergraduate studies. It also can be used to facilitate the
education of leaders at all levels prior to specific deployments, particularly in peace support operations.
OPMS 21 and the development of career fields, particularly for "strategists," are steps in the right direction. So too is
the effort to recognize the importance of existing specialties such as foreign area officers. Personnel planning must also
seek to better maximize assignments following special educational experiences such as fellowships for senior officers.
Finally, care must be taken during the development of career fields to articulate appropriate educational requirements
that must be periodically updated.
These steps should not, however, obscure the need for all officers to continue their education and develop their
intellectual capacity throughout their careers. The Army will still look to the operations career field as the bedrock and
its officers as the essence of the institution--and rightly so, as they will be the profession's senior leaders. But this
should not be used as a reason to deprive these officers of advanced education, as they will still matriculate to
positions of increasing responsibility at the strategic level.
The Army needs to explore ways to increase graduate educational opportunities for the officer corps that do not
penalize officers in terms of advancement within their basic branch. Since 1980 the number of US Army officers
attending advanced civil schooling has decreased dramatically. Increasing these opportunities may also encourage the
retention of our best young officers.
Obviously this must still be managed within the constraints of the officer career path, and innovative methods may be
required. For example, the Army may wish to consider offering an officer a leave of absence at partial pay in order for
him or her to pursue an advanced degree. At the end of the leave of absence the officer would return to the Army, but
join a later year group. This approach was available to officers at the end of the 19th century and would serve to

expand the educational quotient of the officer corps while not penalizing those who have the real concern that graduate
schooling may make them less competitive for command selection due to the fact that they missed the opportunity for
key branch jobs along the way.
Another model to consider for possible wider use is a graduate program offered coincident with attendance at the
advanced course. Officers would be offered the option to enroll simultaneously in a master's degree program either
resident or via distance education while attending their branch advanced course. They could be allowed to remain for
an additional period of time to attend graduate school full-time in order to complete the degree. The Army would pay
the officers their full salary, while the officers might pay any tuition and fees that are not covered by their educational
benefits. This would be a win-win situation for the officer and for the Army. The officer could earn a master's degree
from a quality university, and the Army could enhance the professional knowledge base of its officer corps at a low
cost in terms of both time and money.
The Army should place a higher value on education and on its officers who are educators. One easy and clear way to
demonstrate this would be by increasing the value it places in educator assignments in ROTC units, at the military
academy, and at the staff and war colleges. Congressman Ike Skelton frequently cites the following historical statistic:
of the 34 corps commanders who led the American Army to victory in World War II, 31 had taught in the Army
school system.[21] They were able to apply the professional knowledge they had developed over years of teaching into
the practical business of raising a force, training troops, and leading them successfully in combat.
There is nothing like teaching and thinking deeply about strategy to develop strategic leaders for the future. Former
brigade commanders who go on to flag rank would also be excellent role models and mentors for the younger officers
going through any course as students. They would also have the opportunity to develop further the body of knowledge
in security affairs, military strategy, and operations, and to confront the challenges of the defense-intellectual
community. Consideration might also be given to providing officers at the lieutenant colonel and colonel ranks the
opportunity to return to graduate schooling and complete a doctorate en route to an extended tour as an Army
educator. This would not only serve to enhance the quality of the military school faculties but also encourage the
retention of a larger percentage of senior experienced leaders until they reach mandatory retirement. Moreover, it
would send the message that education is important and highly valued by the institution.
The following is an outline for a revised Army educational program. The key is to integrate or "nest" strategic
education into the existing structure.
Pre-commissioning
Require or strongly recommend core courses in history, international and American politics, economics,
philosophy, culture, and regional geography as part of the curriculum. If officers don't complete these courses
prior to commissioning, they should be encouraged to take them via distance education early in their careers.
Expand ROTC funding and increase the number of scholarships for liberal arts. This will help build a pool of
strategically educated senior leaders in the operations, strategy, and foreign area officer career fields.
Basic Course
As is currently the case, the focus should be on tactical and technical training and leadership, with the following
slight modifications.
Provide an introduction to the different levels of leadership; the differences between the tactical, operational,
and strategic levels of war; and joint operations.
Paint all tactical scenarios within the broader operational and strategic contexts.
All officers would complete a regional strategic orientation for their respective assignment via distance learning.
Each officer would read and discuss the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.
Career Course and CAS3
Stay focused on the tactical level, but blend in just a bit more of the strategic education as described for the
Basic Course.

Build upon and progress beyond the education presented in the Basic Course. Review the National Security
Strategy and the National Military Strategy and consider their evolution since the Basic Course.
Integrate more military and political history into the curriculum.
Teach the basic concepts of "systems thinking," so officers begin to appreciate the phenomena of second- and
third-order effects.
Command and General Staff College
Maintain the current focus, but incorporate a deeper study of strategy, with focus on the National Security
Strategy and the National Military Strategy.
Emphasize systems thinking and teach both critical and creative thinking skills.
Incorporate strategic topics into the course lecture program.
Individual and Unit Officer Professional Development
Build a progressive educational program that includes individual reading, correspondence and continuing
education, lectures, and brown-bag seminars similar to those in the medical and legal professions.
Encourage officers to complete a graduate degree in a field that interests them and benefits the Army.
Incorporate the Chief of Staff of the Army's reading list into these programs and seek ways to provide officers
copies of the books or at least highlight these selections at military bookstores in the United States and abroad.
Provide officers the opportunity to view, via the internet, lectures given to the resident classes at the Command
and General Staff College and the Army War College.
Senior Service College
With the officer education system built upon this foundation, the Army War College can transform into the
world's most advanced strategic education program.
Seek greater synergy with the other senior service colleges through an elective program available to all via
distance education.
This educational transformation will not happen overnight. Rather, it must be part of a reformation in Army culture so
that officers accept life-long learning and education as an obligation of their profession. It should become a
fundamental part of the Army professional ethic. In addition, if the Army acknowledges that education is indeed
valuable, then it must build time into the professional culture for officers to routinely read, write, discuss, and learn.
Senior officers and Army schools should integrate higher strategic concepts into the lives and thinking of our younger
officers. Strategic education should not be an add-on. It should be woven into the fabric of how our officers think, and
the Army's "Be-Know-Do" model of leadership. In these simplified terms of the Army's leadership doctrine, this
proposal invests earlier and more often in the "Know" and "Be" aspects of our officers, so that their ability to "Do" is
enhanced both now and in the future.
Conclusion
During World War I, George C. Marshall was chief of operations with the US First Army in France. He taught in
Army schools from 1927 to 1936. In 1939 he became the Army's Chief of Staff. Of his elevation to that position he
commented:
It became clear to me at age 58, I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the military
manuals or on the battlefield. In this position I am a political soldier and will have to put my training in
rapping out orders and making snap decisions on the back burner, and have to learn the new arts of
persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills.[22]
General Marshall clearly made the transition discussed throughout this article. Still, he may have had the advantage of
time and a less-demanding environment in the period prior to the onset of World War II. The challenge is daunting for
strategic leaders of today as they consider how to establish a better educational system for young officers, so they are
prepared for a future we may know little about. They must accomplish this task during a period characterized by

strategic uncertainty and increasing demands. This effort must be a subset of the larger effort to better craft a
professional identity for the US Army officer of the 21st century. It clearly underscores an acceptance of the fact that
continuous learning by successful adults is difficult but essential to modern organizations.
Emerging leaders who have served in Bosnia, Somalia, or Kosovo as brigade and divisional commanders may well
find this change appropriate as well as necessary. The post-Cold War expansion of the Army's professional jurisdiction
has created a gap between the knowledge that its officers receive during their professional military education and the
professional knowledge that they need to effectively complete the missions they are being assigned in today's complex
security environment. Young officers leading tactical units deployed far from higher headquarters are making decisions
that have far-reaching strategic implications. Senior officers from lieutenant colonel through general are also faced
with far greater complexity and intellectual challenge than in the past. The Army can and should do better in terms of
educating our officers for the challenging situations and tasks they will continue to face in the years ahead. The
professional military education program should require officers to receive more strategic education earlier in their
careers. Greater fusion between education and training is needed that establishes a strategic education glide-path from
pre-commissioning through the senior service college. This concept would replace the current stair-step model in
which officers receive relatively little strategic education until roughly their 20th year of service.
As a profession, the Army's primary obligation to its soldiers and its clients is to provide its professionals with the
abstract knowledge base they will need to apply to the specific situations they will face, from warfighting to peace
operations. As an institution, the Army must face up to this challenge and transform strategic leader education with the
same urgency and energy it is applying to developing the Objective Force. In addition to the well-trained officer we
needed during the Cold War, our jurisdiction during the era of globalization requires a well-educated officer as well.
Like America's strategic challenge of the 21st century, the solution to the Army's professional education challenge is a
process that must be managed, not an event that will be brought to a sudden conclusion.
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